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I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of reliable communications during an
emergency situation is undeniably one of the most critical
factors in preventing loss of life, minimizing property
damage, and sustaining rescue and recovery operations.
However, the broad range of conceivable crises, from local
disasters such as floods or tornadoes to situations with
national or international impact such as airline accidents
or terrorist situations, places extraordinary demands on
associated communications systems.
National security-emergency preparedness is the phrase
used to describe the ability of our nationwide telecommuni-
cations networks to function during times of local or
national stress. [ Ref . 1: p. 15] . In a comprehensive study
of national security-emergency preparedness telecommunica-
tions policy, Stanford Research Institute International
extended the range of possible emergency situations to
include a nuclear conflict and concluded that the following
six attributes were essential in an emergency communications
system: [Ref. 1: pp. 122-123]
1. High Network Availability--the likelihood that any
given user can gain access to and successfully use the
system at a given moment. It includes survivability
and restorability in an emergency or war, reliability
of individual elements, physical redundancy, particu-
larly in avoiding potentially targeted areas, and a
system design responsive to changes in network connec-
tivity.
2. Broad and Controllable Network Access--the need for
broad spatial distribution of access points. Defines
the ability to control access and then establish a
priority call that is maintained across the network.
3. Responsive Network Control--the dynamic allocation of
network resources in accordance with prioritized
demand. Includes monitoring the condition of network
facilities, the status of the overlaying system, and
the interfaces with other networks as well as with
select users.
4. Extensive Interoperability Among Member Networks--
interoperability principally addresses connections
between networks that are as transparent as possible
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at the user level. It is also important for redun-
dancy through alternate-route networks.
5. Flexible Degree of Dedication--to match the degree of
preemption of resources dictated by the magnitude of
the situation. Assumes that some snaring of resources
is likely and that preemption may apply to both public
and private systems. A flexible degree of dedication
foresees the time when stored-program controlled
facilities can be manipulated by authorized agents to
gain needed capability.
5. Wide Range of User Services--refers to user-oriented
services with the potential for encryption, and
reflects a variety of media such as voice, facsimile,
graphics, conferencing, broadcast, and data.
The existence of these attributes in a given communica-
tions system is the end-product of a variety of interrelated
processes such as planning, design and engineering.
However, the degree to which they are successfully imple-
mented to maintain or enhance performance during stressful
situations is directly proportional to the degree of effi-
ciency and effectiveness with which network management capa-
bilities are incorporated into network operations.
Reflecting the intimate relationship between network manage-
ment and emergency communications systems, L. A. Gimpelson of
ITT's European Headquarters states: "The vital role of a
nation's communications network during emergencies is suffi-
cient justification for investment in network management
systems" [ Ref . 2: p. 4] . Lest one is tempted to infer that
the intelligence and sophistication of modern communications
networks has obviated the requirement for network manage-
ment, D. G. Haenschke of Bell Laboratories writes:
"Telecommunications networks play a vital role during emer-
gencies and natural disasters. The benefits of investments
in modern network management capabilities are realized
during such emergencies." [Ref. 3: p. 2242]
A. SCOPE
Many discussions of network management are primarily
concerned with non-technical organizational and administra-
tive issues such as corporate structure, policy, cost anal-
yses, regulations and legislative affairs, and personnel
matters. In yet other presentations, the emphasis is on
more technically-oriented subjects such as access, security
and traffic flow. While it is true that all of these
diverse considerations may be grouped under the heading of
network management, they clearly reflect the difference
between administrative and operational network characteris-
tics. Therefore, for purposes of this thesis the former
category of non-technical, organizational and administrative
issues will be labelled external network management, while
the latter group which contains technical/operational char-
acteristics of a network or system will be considered as
internal network management. Given that distinction,
internal network management will be the focal point of this
paper, and from this point on will be referred to simply as
network management. External management issues, for example
the divestiture of AT&T, will be considered insofar as they
dictate system requirements or otherwise impact on this
discussion, and they will be specifically identified as
external management considerations.
B. APPROACH
This thesis will present a synopsis of current litera-
ture concerning telecommunications network management and
its role in a generic emergency communications network.
Depth of discussion and range of considerations were
dictated by the topical literature reviewed during the
research phase of thesis preparation. Chapter I has
provided a general orientation to the subject matter and
defined the scope of the thesis. Chapter II will examine
the concept of network management in terms of its defini-
tion, performance problems which motivate network management
initiatives, component functions, and technological capabil-
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ities which facilitate modern network management functions.
Chapter III is devoted to the network management system in
the Bell System's Message Telecommunications Service. In
view of their dominant position in the U. S. telecommunica-
tions industry it is no surprise that the bulk of available
information concerning network management has been generated
by the AT&T conglomerate. Then, Chapter IV will outline
operational requirements of a generic emergency communica-
tions system,, and Chapter V will draw together the preceding
chapters by proposing a network management system which
satisfies the stated requirements of a generic emergency
communications system. Finally, Chapter VI will contain




The development of direct distance dialing, the prolif-
eration of transoceanic submarine cables, and the advent of
satellite communications--all of which occurred during the
I960' s--signalled the beginning of the end of manual super-
vision and control of communications networks. Since that
time, dramatic technological advances and an ever-increasing
demand for telecommunications services have resulted in the
evolution of highly sophisticated, extremely complex tele-
communications networks which accomodate a wide variety of
devices and offer a broad range of services to the user.
However, the size, complexity and technological sophistica-
tion of modern networks have created significant network
management problems which must be resolved in order to
ensure maximum performance of the network under all circum-
stances. As a result, "Today, in both national and interna-
tional telecommunications networks, network management has
become an indispensable tool for maintaining network integ-
rity and improving network performance during traffic over-
loads caused by natural disasters, media-stimulated mass
callings, equipment failures and traffic surges on major
holidays." [ Ref . 4: p. 157]
Computer technology has undoubtedly been the primary
contributor to the numerous advances in communications tech-
nology witnessed in recent years. However, it has proven to
be somewhat of a double-edged sword. The use of stored-
program control and other refinements paved the way for
development of automatic routing and automatic controls, and
led to increasingly autonomous operations by "intelligent"
devices throughout the network. As a result, network
management problems have been compounded, particularly in
the areas of problem isolation and identification. Thus, in
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addition to providing the potential, computer technology has
also created the necessity for development of network
management systems on a technological par with the networks
they are designed to manage. At this point it should be
emphasized that despite the strides being made in the field
of artificial intelligence and the development of so-called
expert systems, no automated system, regardless of its
degree of sophistication, is capable of providing optimal
response in every situation, nor can it eliminate the need
for human intervention in some situations. Therefore, the
increasing reliance on automated systems must be tempered
with the capacity for manual intervention when required.
Wong displays an awareness of this requirement when he
writes, "The future approach to network management, both
national and international, would be to provide an econom-
ical balance between automatic and manual network management
capabilities, with emphasis on continued improvement in
automatic controls" [ Ref . 4: p. 158] . A similar attitude is
expressed by Westcott, Burruss and Begg who state: "The
goal of automated network management is to change the way
large computer networks .are monitored and controlled in
order to allow a more natural form of interaction between
human staff and the Network Operations Center" [Ref. 5:
p. 43].
A. DEFINITION
A concept as broad as network management may be defined
or described in many ways. A survey of contemporary topical
literature reveals the following examples:
Successful network management can be succinctly
described as the complete, organized control of the
motion of data through a network which results in the
highest percentage of reliability, availability and
utilization with the least amount of internal delay.
[Ref. 6: p. 819]
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Network management is concerned with network surveil-
lance and control, as well as fault detection and
service restoration. [ Ref . 7: p. 893]
Network management consists of real-time monitoring and
control of the network. It is a technique designed to
optimize the capacity of the network when the network is
under stress due to traffic overload or failure.
[Ref. 3: p. 2239]
Network management can be defined as the function of
supervising the network and taking action to control the
flow of traffic so as to ensure maximum utilization of
the network in all situations. [Ref. 8: p. 78]
The base task of network management consists of moni-
toring, diagnosis and control. [Ref. 9: p. 47]
The purpose of network management is to optimize the
performance of the network during overloads or other
stresses. [Ref. 10: p. 23]
The common theme of all the above definitions is the
employment of monitoring and control functions as a means of
optimizing network performance under any conditions, and
this common theme provides the basis for a working defini-
tion of network management, i.e., network management is the
set of monitoring and control functions utilized to sustain
and enhance network performance in response to a variety of
dynamic operational situations.
B. NETWORK MONITORING
"Network monitoring is the real-time collection and
recording of data about network behavior provided by network
components" [Ref. 5: p. 43] . Its purpose is to give network
management an indication of problem conditions in time to
initiate corrective actions before network performance is
degraded. Simply put, data provided as a result of network
monitoring tells management processors and personnel what is
happening throughout the network, where problems are devel-
oping, and what is the source of the problem. To answer
14
these questions, several categories of information must be
provided, including the status of individual network
elements, the overall status of the network, subscriber
information and traffic flow data such as offered load and
throughput. Obviously, continuous monitoring of a modern
communications network would result in generation of massive
amounts of data with the potential for overwhelming network
management equipment and staff. Therefore, preliminary
decisions must be made as to what types of information are
required at various levels of the management hierarchy, and
how will the information be reported. Determining what
types of data are to be reported is a management decision
which is based on historical reference data and current
system application. However, it normally will involve
network configuration, status of network components, or
statistical information.
As for how the information will be reported, there are
basically three reporting strategies used in modern network
management schemes:
1. Automatic reporting--periodic forwarding of informa-
tion in accordance with a predetermined schedule or on
an as-occurring basis.
2. Response reporting--forwarding information in response
to polling messages from superior elements in the
network, or in response to demands from network
management for specific types of information.
3. Reporting by exception--forwarding information on
situations which exceeds preset performance standards
as promulgated by network management.
The use of response reporting and reporting by exception
is one method of controlling the amount of data received at
various levels of the management structure. In addition, in
most hierarchical management systems a certain amount of
filtering and "multiplexing" occurs as data is transmitted
upwards through the management hierarchy. Once network
monitoring or surveillance processes have reported a failure
or alerted network management to an impending problem in the
network, corrective or preventive actions must be taken to
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maintain network performance levels - hence the need for
network control. [ Ref . 5: p. 43]
C. NETWORK CONTROL
Network control is the active manipulation/modification
of network elements by network management in order to
correct, bypass or prevent problems which may detract from
overall network performance. The primary problem affecting
network performance during an emergency situation is
congestion which may be caused by loss of resources or
increased demand for service. There are two general types
of controls which may be activated to alleviate the impact
of congestion on a network: expansive controls and protec-
tive controls.
1. Expansive Controls
Expansive controls increase capacity by providing
substitute or additional circuit paths for traffic flow to
reduce the effects of congestion. Expansive controls
improve network performance by utilizing more suitable
routing choices during overloads and failures. Since the
information required to make decisions concerning alterna-
tive routing possibilities is derived from switching systems
located throughout the network, the "intelligence" which
automates expansive controls is normally located at a
central network management location.
2. Protective Controls
Protective controls are also known as restrictive
controls and they limit the amount of traffic destined to
enter a congested portion of the network, or reduce the
number of alternate routing possibilities. The value of
protective controls is that during congestion they increase
throughput by restricting traffic to the most direct, single
link paths. It follows then that the information required
for the protective control decision-making process would be
available within a given switching system, and therefore the
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"intelligence" would be imbedded in the individual switching
systems.
In keeping with the previously mentioned desir-
ability of having both automatic and manual control capabil-
ities in a network management system, both expansive and
protective controls are capable of being implemented either
manually or automatically. Examples of this will be seen in
the discussions of specific systems in Chapters III and IV.
D. TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT
Advanced network capabilities such as stored-program
controlled (SPC) exchanges. Common Channel Signalling and
dynamic routing provide major opportunities for network
management [ Ref . 4: p. 158]
.
1. SPC Exchanges
Stored-program controlled exchanges or switching
systems employ imbedded computer programs to direct
switching operations. Modern SPC exchanges, especially the
digital ones, are far more flexible, efficient and powerful
than the conventional electro-mechanical exchanges.
However, SPC exchanges are susceptible to hardware and soft-
ware failures which could cause the exchange to fail or
congest, thereby putting that portion of the network
serviced by the exchange into an overload condition [ Ref. 4:
p. 158] .
The most prominent examples of SPC exchanges in
modern communications networks are Western Electric
Company's No. 4 and No. 5 Electronic Switching Systems (ESS).
a. No. 4 ESS
The No. 4 ESS is a high-capacity, toll (Class 4)
switching system, and it was the vehicle by which electronic
switching was first introduced into the Bell System long
distance telecommunications network. No. 4 ESS was designed
to provide improved surveillance and control over subordi-
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nate portions of the network, and to expand routing opportu-
nities and restrict traffic flow during overload conditions.
These features are intended to cope with increasingly
complex networks and to maintain overall efficiency of the
network despite traffic surges which occur in overloaded
portions of the network [ Ref . 11: p. 1022] . No. 4 ESS opera-
tions are based upon a high-speed electronic central
processor which uses stored-program control to operate the
central office on a time-shared basis. In No. 4 ESS, most
of the automatic controls, traffic handling, and administra-
tive functions are provided by the stored programs,
b. No. 5 ESS
No. 5 ESS is the first local (Class 5) digital
switching system and is the most versatile local/toll switch
in the Bell System [Ref. 12: p. 258] . No. 5 ESS is similar
in design and operation to its toll counterpart, the No. 4
ESS, however, hardware and software advances enable No. 5
ESS to provide more advanced features. No. 5 ESS displays a
distributed architecture wherein the system "intelligence"
is distributed among the central processor and interface
modules located throughout the network. Also, No. 5 ESS
offers direct integration with digital transmission systems
[Ref. 12: pp. 258-259] .
SPC exchanges will become dominant in future telecommu-
nications networks, however special attention should be
given to the development of network management tech-
niques that can alleviate switching congestion in an SPC
network. [ Ref. 4: p. 158]
2. Common Channel Signalling
Common channel signalling involves the use of a
separate out-of-band channel for carrying set-up and control
information between switching systems. In a broader context
which is more relevant to this discussion, SPC networks can
employ the CCS capability as a high-speed signalling network
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separate from, but interactive with, the conventional tele-
communications network [ Ref . 4: p. 158] . By interconnecting
SPC exchanges via a CCS network, faster, more reliable and
more efficient operation of the network can be achieved.
Once again, the most prominent example of CCS technology in
operation is found within the Bell System.
a. Common Channel Interoffice Signalling Network
The Common Channel Interoffice Signalling
network evolved from CCITT recommendation number 5, and is
used to provide reliable, efficient switching capability
between SPC exchanges [Ref. 14: p. 263]. The CCIS network
consists of twenty (20) Signal Transfer Points (STPs) allo-
cated in pairs to each of the ten (10) switching regions
across the United States, and the links by which they are
connected to the switching systems [Ref. 14: pp. 263-264]
.
Normally the traffic load is shared between the two STPs in
each switching region, but each STP is capable of servicing
the entire region if its counterpart fails. Links between
switching offices and STPs within a region are called
A-links and are allocated in pairs--one link to each STP.
STPs in a given switching region are connected to all other
STPs by B-links which exist in groups of four called quads
[Ref. 14: p. 264].
3. Dynamic Routing
Dynamic routing is the ability to extend network
routing to increase utilization, and is made possible by the
use of SPC exchanges communicating via CCS networks. In a
dynamic routing scheme, traffic may be routed directly
between source and destination exchanges, or it may utilize
one or more intermediate exchanges depending upon network
conditions. The routing choices between any two exchanges
are preset for varying periods of time based on past experi-
ence and historical reference data. Dynamic routing implies
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a nodal orientation of the network and makes it necessary to
place more emphasis on automatic controls that are reliable
and robust, and not dependent upon manual administration
[Ref. 4: p. 158] .
Wong also mentions the integrated services digital
network ( ISDN) as another technological capability amenable
to network management. However, ISDN is still in the very
preliminary stages of development and does not affect
contemporary network management considerations. Having
examined network management, its component functions and
technological advances which lend themselves to network
management efforts, the next step is to look at the problems
which create the need for network management in modern
communications networks.
E. NETWORK PROBLEMS
Communications networks are required to handle various
levels of offered load. However, it is not sufficient to
design a system to carry a normal load efficiently and to
disregard its performance under overload conditions. In
fact, the most widely known aspects of network management
are traffic overload controls [Ref. 2: p. 4] . Overload
conditions occur when the demand for service is greater than
network capacity is able to handle efficiently. Increased
demand may be generated by natural or man-made disasters,
holidays, or events of national interest whereas decreased
capacity may result from internal delay or inability to cope
with increased traffic load, or the planned or unplanned
shutdown of transmission or switching facilities [Ref. 8:
pp. 79-80] . Haenschke writes that "it is a property of
modern telephone networks with common control and alternate
routing arrangements that they are highly effective under
engineered load conditions but deteriorate under overloads"
[Ref. 15: p. 1170] . Common control means that one set of
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hardware is used to set-up and control the flow of traffic
through a part of the network. This is in contrast to
nodal- type networks wherein each switching stage is
controlled independently throughout a given portion of the
network. Modern SPC exchanges are "made-to-order" for a
common control approach, and it has become a marked charac-
teristic of modern communications networks. Alternate
routing refers to the use of intermediate or substitute
circuits when a problem exists in some portion, of a network,
and is also a characteristic of modern networks [ Ref , 8:
p. 79].
Under overload, modern networks that employ common
control and alternate routing can be forced into an ineffi-
cient, congested state marked by a decline in network
capacity [Ref. 3: pp. 2240-2241] . There are two basic
reasons for the loss of capacity in a network in a congested
state: [Ref. 3: pp. 2241-2242]
1. Excessive alternate routing--increases the number of
links between source and destination, thereby
increasing the amount of blocking which occurs and
decreasing the level of network utilization. This
situation may be alleviated by restricting the number
of alternate routing choices, and by using trunk
reservation schemes.
2. Switching delays--the dominant cause of loss of
capacity in a network under overload. They may be
compounded by user reattempts, and they tend to esca-
late throughout the network. Network control response
depends on both network architecture and switching
system(s) architecture.
Excessive or unnecessary application of control measures
needlessly inhibits traffic flow, and may create or compound
congestion in a network under overload. Therefore, imple-
mentation of control responses should be tailored to the
existing condition. To support a tailored response, over-
load conditions are differentiated as follows: [Ref. 2:
p. 8-9]
1. General overload--overload which affects the entire
network. Within this category fall overloads
resulting from increased point-to-point loads
throughout the network, and overloads caused by the
spread of congestion from a local overload. The best
example of a general overload is seen in the telephone
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system on occasions such as Christmas or Mother's Day
when users throughout the network compete for service,
2. Local overload--overloads caused by small-scale events
such as local storms or equipment failures. The
response to a local overload is concerned with
resolving the existing congestion problem, and perhaps
even more importantly, preventing the spread of
congestion to other parts of the network. Examples of
local overload occur after floods or tornadoes when
some users attempt to contact family or friends and
yet other users attempt to reach emergency information
services, all at the same time.
3, Focused overload--overload caused by abnormally high
volumes of traffic into a particular portion of the
network. For example, consider a police switchboard
at the 911 exchange during an emergency situation.
The potential for spread of congestion during a
focused overload is very high due to the combination
of very low throughput and the very high number of
attempts and reattempts by users.
For reasons not entirely clear to the author, discus-
sions in contemporary literature concerning network manage-
ment and the problems it is intended to alleviate
concentrate almost entirely on overload and congestion
issues as discussed above. This may indicate that the level
of sophistication of modern telecommunications networks is
such that other problems are of little or no concern.
However, in the examination of emergency communications
requirements in Chapter IV, additional network management
problems will be identified. Whether or not these problems
are unique to emergency communications remains to be seen.
In any event, this chapter has provided the background
information for the survey of a specific network management
system which is presented in the next chapter.
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III. THE BELL SYSTEM APPROACH
The heart of the national telecommunications network,
and most of its veins and arteries, has been the AT&T Bell
System [ Ref . 16: p. 21] . Since 1909, the stated goal of AT&T
has been "one policy, one system, universal service"
[Ref. 16: p. 21] , and during the past seventy five-plus years
the goal has become a reality. In conjunction with its
operating companies the Bell System became THE telephone
company whose standards and specifications are accepted
throughout the industry, thus endowing the network with a
high degree of interoperability throughout. In addition,
visionary planning and continuous refinement of network
capabilities and capacity have enabled the network to keep
pace with state-of-the-art technology and the ever-
increasing demand for services. Having dominated the U. S.
telecommunications industry for three-quarters of a century,
the Bell System has been the pacesetter in network manage-
ment, operations and research.
A. MESSAGE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE
The Message Telecommunications Service (MTS) and the
Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS) are the primary compo-
nents of the Public Switched Network (PSN) and together they
comprise the finest long distance telephone network in the
world [Ref. 17: pp. 17-18] . " The North American Message
Telecommunications Service network functions as a single,
integrated entity to which customers have access for voice
telephone calls, data calls, and other uses such as
facsimile transmission" [Ref. 3: p. 2240] . At the present
time, many initiatives are underway to improve overall
management of the MTS including enhanced manual network
management controls and real-time network performance
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monitoring capabilities. In addition, the network itself is
being enhanced by the rapid introduction of Stored-Program
Controlled (SPC) exchanges interconnected via the Common
Channel Interoffice Signalling (CCIS) system [ Ref . 3:
pp. 2239-2240] .
In the early days of the MTS, each major toll (Class 4)
switching system in the network had a dedicated management
center which monitored and controlled the performance of
only that part of the network serviced by the switching
system. More recently, the trend has been towards a "clus-
tered" management approach, i. e. , the use of centralized
management centers to monitor and control a number of
switching systems "clustered" in a large geographical area
such as an entire metropolitan area, or in some cases, an
entire state [Ref. 3: p. 2246] . As a result, the MTS network
management system as it exists today is based on a three-
level hierarchy as follows:
Network Operations Center (1)
Regional Operations Center ( 10)
Network Management Center (27)
1. Network Management Center
The bottom level of the MTS network management hier-
archy consists of twenty- seven Network Management Centers,
or NMCs, located throughout the United States. Each NMC in
conjunction with its supporting operating system provides
both automatic and manual capabilities for monitoring
performance of the toll (Class 4) and local (Class 5)
switching systems within its cluster, identifying actual or
potential problems, and initiating appropriate response
actions within a time span ranging from a few seconds for
automatic controls to a few minutes for manual controls. In
addition, the NMC provides the capability for monitoring the
performance of automatic controls once they are implemented
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and for "fine tuning" the automatic control response as
required. The operating system monitors the performance of
subordinate portions of the network, collects and forwards
performance data, and serves as the medium for implementa-
tion of control measures and for transmission of data in
both directions between the NMC and other system elements
[ Ref . 3: pp. 2240-2248] . A more in-depth look at the NMC
operating system will be presented later in this chapter.
Each Network Management Center is jointly staffed by
Bell Operating Company and Long Lines personnel, and in some
cases by representatives of independent companies as well.
Network managers at the NMC plan the employment of automatic
network management controls in the portion of the network
under their cognizance. Manual controls are implemented in
subordinate switching systems by communicating control
commands over the same links used to forward information
from the various switching systems [Ref. 3: p. 2249]
.
2. Regional Operations Center
The Regional Operations Center or ROC occupies the
middle level of the MTS network management system hierarchy
and is supported by the same type of operating system as the
NMC. The ROC provides a higher level of performance moni-
toring and control than is found at the NMC level - whereas
the NMC has direct responsibility for the toll (Class 4) and
local (Class 5) switching systems within a cluster, the ROC
manages the activities of the two or three Network
Management Centers in its region. In addition, the ROC may
serve as a backup system for its subordinate NMCs in the
event of failure at the NMC level. This redundancy is made
possible by the fact that both the NMC and the ROC utilize
the same operating system. The ROC also has responsibility
for first-stage monitoring of the CCIS network in its region
[Ref. 3: pp. 2247-2248] . There is one Regional Operations
Center in each of the ten switching regions delineated by
the Bell System throughout the United States.
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3. The ROC/NMC Operating System
The operating system which supports activities of
both the Network Management Centers and the Regional
Operations Centers in the MTS network is called the
Engineering and Administrative Data Acquisition System for
Network Management (EADAS/NM). There are thirty-one such
systems in operation throughout the network with four
systems dedicated to supporting four of the ten ROCs,
twenty-one systems dedicated to supporting twenty-one of the
twenty- seven NMCs, and each of the remaining six systems are
shared by a ROC and an NMC, for a total of thirty-one
systems.
The primary functions of the EADAS/NM operating
system are: [ Ref . 3: pp. 2251-2252]
1. Collect network performance data on an event basis
every thirty seconds and traffic load data every five
minutes. As shall be seen later, these time intervals
are preset, and subsequently controlled, at the
Network Operations Center.
2. Analyze data to identify "exception" conditions and
other less critical performance parameters, and output
the results of that analysis to wall displays,
printers and CRT terminals in the ROC or NMC.
3. Facilitate activation of network management controls
by transmitting control messages to the appropriate
switching system(s).
4. Maintain network management databases by auditing and
inputting specified performance data. Also allows
manual input of data into reference databases.
5. Transmit required information to higher level oper-
ating systems to facilitate overall network manage-
ment.
The local (Class 5) and some small toll (Class 4)
switching systems in each NMC cluster are connected with the
EADAS/NM system by an intermediate data sub-system simply
called the EADAS system. In some cases, the intermediate
system may not be Bell's EADAS system, but a similar system
provided by an independent company. In time, this situation
will probably become more common as a result of the divesti-
ture of AT&T. The larger toll (Class 4) switching systems
and the CCIS network's Signal Transfer Points are intercon-
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nected with the EADAS/NM system via direct data links which
are used to exchange information in both directions [ Ref . 3:
p. 2246] .
4. Network Operations Center
The single Network Operations Center (NOC) sits atop
the MTS management system hierarchy and is supported by a
unique operating system. The NOC is responsible for coordi-
nating and managing the activities of the ten Regional
Operations Centers and the twenty- seven Network Management
Centers, the international portion of the network which
consists of seven gateways through which all overseas
traffic flows, and overall management of the CCIS network.
The primary objectives of the MTS network management system
are:
1. Ensure optimal utilization of network resources,
2. Maximize use of idle capacity when failures occur,
3. Implement control actions as required,
4. Establish a unified network management methodology,
. 5. Determine the future direction of network management
capabilities,
6. Provide guidance to the ROCs and the NMCs regarding
control responses to problems in the network, and
7. Conduct network management training.
The centralization of network management responsibility
ensures unity of purpose and consistency of application
throughout the network. [Ref. 18: pp. 2261-2266]
5. Network Operations Center System
The Network Operations Center System (NOCS) is a
unique operating system designed specifically to support the
Network Operations Center. The basic functions of the NOCS
are to collect performance data from subordinate management
entities throughout the network at specified time intervals,
analyze the collected data, and output the results to
graphic displays, printers and terminals in the NOC. Due to
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its critical role in the MTS national network management
system, an identical system is kept in operational condition
at a separate site. Should a failure occur in the on-line
system, the back-up system can be brought on-line within
fifteen minutes using manual switches to transfer EADAS/NM
lines and I/O devices from one system to the other [ Ref . 18:
p. 2268]
.
Data transfer and message transmissions in both
directions between the NOCS and subordinate EADAS/NM systems
are accomplished via an intermediate data acquisition system
which consists of a Data Transfer Point (DTP) and the links
which carry the information. This same intermediate system
is used to interface with the seven overseas gateways and
the CCIS network's Signal Transfer Points [Ref. 18:
pp. 2266-2269] .
6. System Operations
The two underlying principles of the MTS network
management system are polling and exception reporting. As
stated earlier, EADAS/NM data collection is performed at
thirty second or five minute intervals at both the ROC and
the NMC levels depending on the type of information being
collected. These intervals are preset at the NOC level and
controlled by the NOC operating system's Data Transfer
Point. At the start of an interval, the DTP signals both
the Network Operations Center System and the EADAS/NM
systems. At the lower levels, this signal initiates a
polling process whereby messages are sent to subordinate
switching systems at the NMC level, and to subordinate
EADAS/NM systems as well as subordinate switching systems at
the ROC level to elicit forwarding of the required data. At
the NMCs, when responses have been received from all
"pollees", data analysis is conducted. Exception conditions
are identified by comparing collected data with performance
thresholds stipulated by the Network Operations Center, and
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other performance parameters are isolated as required. The
results are output to the various visual, graphic and hard-
copy devices in the NMC. In this manner, network managers
are alerted to impending problems and kept informed as to
the overall status of the network. In addition, information
concerning situations which could impact on other portions
of the network, and information concerning problems for
which control actions have been implemented is transmitted
to the ROC. Finally, reference information is input to
local databases as dictated by the NMC management staff. At
the ROC level, the procedure is basically the same using
information provided by the subordinate EADAS/NM systems at
the NMC level. At ROCs having the more modern toll (Class4)
switching systems within their area of responsibility, addi-
tional data is provided by a passive monitoring scheme
wherein the data is routinely forwarded from the switching
system. This passive monitoring is confined to the more
"intelligent" switching systems such as those equipped with
SPC technology.
At the Data Transfer Point, incoming data is accumu-
lated until a cutoff point is reached shortly before the end
of each interval. At that time, the DTP signals subordinate
EADAS/NM systems to cease forwarding information, and trans-
mits the accumulated data the Network Operations Center
System. Any information reaching the DTP after this time is
discarded. The NOCS performs the same analytical functions
as mentioned previously, and outputs results to the various
NOC devices and databases. In addition, the NOCS processor
stores the data for twenty minutes so that at any given
moment, national network management personnel have ready
access to data collected during the four most recent
intervals.
It should be pointed out that continuous monitoring
of the national network results in a tremendous volume of
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information being generated. The exception reporting
approach used for the majority of data, as well as the
filtering/multiplexing of information which occurs at the
NMC and ROC levels, prevent the NOCS from being overwhelmed.
Also, the majority of control responses are initiated at the
Network Management Center level--the lowest level of the
system hierarchy. In fact, Haenschke states: "The heart of
the MTS network management system is the Network Management
Center and its supporting operating system" [ Ref . 3:
p. 2240] . As a result, the bulk of the data which reaches
the Network Operations Center at the top of the hierarchy is
used for purely administrative purposes such as updating
historical databases, setting future performance thresholds,
and providing guidance to the ROCs and NMCs regarding appli-
cation of controls. However, it can be used in a more oper-
ational manner to fine tune control responses implemented at
lower levels of the network, to resolve problems which are
beyond the scope of regional capabilities, or in rare
instances to provide backup service in the event of failure
at one of the Regional Operations Centers.
The MTS network management system provides a variety
of control mechanisms which can be implemented either auto-
matically or manually at any level of the system hierarchy
to provide optimal response to changing conditions in the
network. The following sections will present a closer look
at some of these controls.
B. AUTOMATIC CONTROLS
The increasing "intelligence" of SPC switching systems
has been the prime factor in development of a series of
automatic network management controls which provide real-
time response to existing or impending problems in that
portion of the network serviced by the SPC exchange. As
mentioned earlier in this paper, these may be either protec-
tive or expansive controls.
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1. Selective Dynamic Overload Control
Selective Dynamic Overload Control (SDOC) is a
protective control used to relieve switch congestion. When
a switch becomes congested it sends a signal through the
CCIS network to all interconnected switches. Upon receipt
of the signal, the other switches respond by reducing the
flow of traffic to the congested switch. The reduction in
traffic flow may be accomplished by alternate routing,
queuing or blocking. This response not only helps reduce
traffic to the congested switch, it helps prevent congestion
from spreading to other portions of the network [ Ref . 10:
pp. 24-25] . In an SPC network, switching or exchange
congestion could be a critical problem. An SDOC response
would require that each SPC exchange have the capability of
sensing multiple levels of congestion and transmitting over-
load control signals to other exchanges via the CCIS
network. The response to these overload signals would be
selective reduction in traffic destined for the congested
exchange based on the type of overload signal transmitted.
For example, all hard-to-reach traffic ( see below) destined
for the congested exchange would be restricted at the first
level, and at the second level of congestion all that hard-
to-reach traffic plus a portion of other traffic destined
for the congested exchange would be restricted, and so on.
Should the congestion exceed higher levels, more and more
traffic destined for the congested exchange would be
restricted [Ref. 4: p. 159] .
2. Hard-To-Reach Traffic
Studies have shown that network congestion due to
overload begins with circuit congestion and proceeds to
switch or exchange congestion. This transition occurs when
successful transmissions which, by definition, involve long
holding times on the network, are replaced by numerous
unsuccessful attempts which by nature result in short
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holding times. The short holding time allows more and more
attempts to be made, particularly in an emergency situation,
leading to circuit congestion which ultimately creates
switch congestion. By blocking unsuccessful attempts, or
reducing their number, the congestion could be avoided.
Designation of specific destinations as hard-to-reach, based
on the volume of unsuccessful attempts, is a means of accom-
plishing that goal. Because it involves restricting traffic
flow to designated destinations, the hard-to-reach measure
is a protective control which also enhances the value of
other protective controls such as SDOC ( see preceding
section). Implementation of the hard-to-reach control
leaves circuits available for traffic with a higher chance
of successfully reaching its destination [ Ref . 4: p. 159]
.
Unfortunately, the designation of a specific destination as
hard-to-reach is done on the basis of historical reference
data. However, the unique nature of emergency situations is
such that the necessary data may not be available.
Therefore the value of this particular control response in
managing an emergency communications network is questionable
unless the crisis lasts long enough to allow compilation of
requisite reference data.
3. Selective Trunk Reservation
Selective Trunk Reservation (STR) is a protective
control that responds to congestion on outgoing circuits or
trunks (circuit groups). This control response involves
monitoring the number of idle circuits in a trunk, and when
that number exceeds a predetermined threshold, the idle
circuits are reserved for transmitting traffic for which
that circuit or trunk is the first choice route. Since
first-choice routed traffic, as opposed to alternate route
traffic, normally uses the most direct route between source
and destination, the result is higher throughput and there-
fore more efficient utilization of available network
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capacity [ Ref . 10: p. 25]. In adopting an STR scheme, it
would be desirable to use a multiple level approach similar
to that described previously in relation to the SDOC mecha-
nism. For example, when the number of idle circuits exceeds
the first threshold, the idle circuits would be reserved for
all traffic other than hard-to-reach traffic. Then as
succeeding thresholds are passed, more and more traffic
would be denied access to the reserved circuits [ Ref. 4:
p. 150] . Although the STR scheme is similar in some ways to
SDOC, particularly in use of multiple-level responses, it
should be noted that while the SDOC response is based on
receipt of overload control signals from the congested
switch or exchange, the STR response is based on circuit
monitoring with no control messages required. The feature
that makes both of these protective controls highly effec-
tive is that they control hard-to-reach traffic much more
severely than other types of traffic [Ref. 3: p. 2243].
4. Automatic Rerouting
Sometimes referred to as Automatic Out-of-Chain
routing, this expansive control enables traffic which over-
flowed its normal routing paths to be spread over additional
routes that are not normally available for routing. In the
Bell System, where it is called Automatic Out-of-Chain
routing, up to seven additional routes may be made avail-
able. Normally, the additional routes are assigned to each
source based on the various destinations. The inherent
danger in this control response is that rerouted traffic
could end up being "looped" around the network, never
reaching its intended destination. Use of a "flag" or
classmark will prevent this situation from developing
[Ref. 4: p. 160] . In the Bell System, Automatic Out-of-Chain
routing is made possible by SPC exchanges communicating via
the CCIS network. "Automatic Out-of-Chain routing is a
first step towards improved network utilization by taking
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advantage of capacity often available due to traffic non-
coincidence. " [ Ref . 3: p. 2245]
5. Automatic Gapping Control
"Gapping" is a protective control specifically
designed to alleviate focused overloads [Ref. 4: p. 150] , An
example might be the 911 emergency number which is over-
whelmed by incoming calls during an emergency situation.
Gapping would involve monitoring the number of calls made in
a given period of time. When the volume per time interval
exceeds a predetermined level, a control signal is trans-
mitted via the CCIS network, and all interconnected switches
respond by blocking traffic to that destination for a speci-
fied "gap" period. When the gap time has passed, waiting
traffic would be forwarded one at a time, with the same gap
period between each one, until the overload situation has
been resolved. Resolution of the overload would be indi-
cated to the various switches by another control message
transmitted via the CCIS network.
C. MANUAL CONTROLS
Manual controls are extremely desirable in modern
network management systems to respond to situations beyond
the scope of automatic controls, to "fine tune" automatic
control responses, and to provide a backup capability in the
event of hardware or software failure that affects automatic
controls. Wong provides comments on several types of manual
controls as follows: [ Ref. 4: p. 160]
1. Circuit Group Controls
This category of manual controls should include
manual rerouting to assign traffic to routes not normally
available, manual cancellation of direct or alternate routes
to/from a particular circuit group, and manual skip control
which causes traffic to "skip over" or bypass a trunk in the
normal routing chain. It should be fairly obvious that
manual routing and manual cancellation controls are anala-
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gpus to the automatic alternate routing (AOOC) and Selective
Trunk Reservation ( STR) controls, respectively. "In all
manual circuit group controls, network managers should be
able to specify the percentage of traffic to be affected and
the type(s) of traffic to be affected. This would allow
network problems to be resolved by controlling a minimum of
traffic and not by over-controlling. " [ Ref . 4: p. 160]
2. Manual Code Controls
Manual code controls are similar to automatic
gapping controls except that they are initiated manually.
At each switch or exchange, network managers should be able
to specify controlled destinations, gapping intervals, and
duration of the controls.
3. Automatic Control Modifications
When automatic controls are triggered, network
managers should be able to "fine tune" or adjust their
parameters in order to provide optimal response to the
problem at hand. This is particularly true in emergency
situations since each crisis is fairly unique unto itself,
and therefore automatic controls may not provide the optimum
response. The parameters to be modified might include
response levels in the STR and SDOC functions, or standards
for designating a particular destination as hard-to-reach.
"Since the optimum control response depends on the severity,
geographical distribution and type of overload, maximizing
network performance requires the coordination of automatic
control responses with manual controls employed in combina-
tion. " [Ref. 19: p. 382] Table I below illustrates the rela-
tionship between automatic and manual control responses
relative to a particular network problem
The preceding overview of the MTS network management
system indicates that it contains the capabilities necessary
to achieve optimal performance of the network under a
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variety of operational circumstances. Its applicability to
a generic emergency communications system will be considered
later, but in view of the structure and capabilities of the
managed network, it is obvious that this particular network
management system will be a primary consideration in the
network management system proposed in Chapter V.
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IV. EMERGENCY SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Under normal circumstances, the goal of network manage-
ment is to provide maximum performance in response to user
demand. Technically, this is accomplished by minimizing the
amount of blocking which occurs in the network, thereby
maximizing the level of call completion. The primary cause
of blocking in a network is congestion which may be gener-
ated as a result of overload or failure in some portion of
the network. This explains the concern with avoiding and/or
preventing congestion which was so obvious in the Message
Telecommunications Service network management system
discussed in the previous chapter of this paper. However,
in an emergency situation, the priorities are significantly
altered. In fact, in order to support emergency communica-
tions during a crisis, it is necessary to restrict or block
communications other than those originated by designated
critical users. Therefore, the role of network management
is altered as well. Performance is still the main concern,
but it is performance strictly defined in terms of desig-
nated users, precedence, and available network resources.
This chapter examines several operational capabilities which
would enable a network management system to support critical
user communications during an emergency situation by
controlling user access, identifying and preserving traffic
precedence levels, and optimizing utilization of available
network resources and capacity.
A. SURVIVABILITY
Survivability of a communications network is defined as
the ability of the network to provide service to critical
users during stressful situations. The concerns embodied in
the survivability issue are physical destruction of network
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facilities, and traffic load in excess of the network's
designed "worst-case" capability [ Ref . 20: p. 103]
.
Survivability is clearly the most fundamental requirement of
an emergency communications system, and it is a function of
both availability and connectivity. Availability refers to
the ability of users to access the network despite the loss
of some network components, and it implies a broad distribu-
tion of access points throughout the network. Connectivity
concerns the ability of one site to communicate with other
sites remaining in the network. These are not independent
functions, for access is meaningless without the ability to
establish communications, and vice versa [Ref. 20: p. 105]
.
There are many approaches taken when considering network
survivability, but the basic choice is between protection
and proliferation [Ref. 21: p. 169] . The protection view-
point is that the system can be physically protected from
damage through such measures as "hardening" of network
facilities and equipment, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
shielding. On the other hand, the proliferation approach
reflects the theory that distribution of functions and capa-
bilities at numerous locations throughout the network
ensures that a significant percentage of those network func-
tions and capabilities will remain intact. Of the two,
proliferation appears to be the most feasible, for the
following reasons:
1. In terms of both time and money, proliferation is less
costly than hardening [Ref. 21].
2. Due to those costs, hardening can be accomplished only
at a limited number of locations in the network.
Therefore, choices must be made as to which sites will
be hardened^ and the variables involved in that
decision-making process are best guess" estimates at
most. For example, if the decision to harden a given
site is based on the probability that that particular
site will be a target during a war, as opposed to
another site^ the survivability of that site depends
on the validity of the targetting estimate, and the
degree to which hardening that is accomplished can
withstand the various types of possible enemy strikes.
3. Using a proliferation approach, survival of the
network s communications capability is not dependent
upon survival of specific portions of the network.
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4. The proliferation approach is highly compatible with
network management functions, and promotes full utili-
zation of network management capabilities in support
of the survivability objective.
With regard to network management functions, the prolif-
eration approach dictates wide distribution of both moni-
toring and control capabilities throughout the network.
Should portions of the network be lost, the redundancy of
these capabilities ensures back-up services that will allow
monitoring and control functions to continue in surviving
portions of the network. Also, redundancy of access points
throughout the network ensures that critical users will be
able to utilize remaining communications resources. As far
as connectivity is concerned, the application of network
management controls aids in taking maximum advantage of
surviving communications resources and capacity. More
specifically, restrictive measures will control the flow of
traffic to avoid overwhelming available resources and to
increase the potential for use of the network by critical
users. In addition, expansive controls provide increased
potential for connectivity in support of critical user
communications.
The concept of critical users figures prominently in the
preceding discussion of survivability, and is the basis for
implementation of precedence-related functions in a network
management system that supports emergency communications.
Designation of critical users is an external management
function, and as such is beyond the scope of this discus-
sion. However, SRI concludes that there is a definite need
for a coordinated effort in this area among a variety of
associated organizations including the National
Communications System, the Federal Communications




As noted in the previous section, broad distribution of
access points throughout the network is a prerequisite for
achieving availability, and therefore survivability, when
the proliferation approach is adopted. However, in view of
the normal public reaction to an emergency situation, it is
to be expected that the demand for access will be exces-
sively high, and so a control problem will be created that
must be resolved in order to support emergency communica-
tions by critical users. Once critical users have been
identified at the various levels of government and industry,
priorities must be established among them, and a mechanism
for providing requisite services to those users must be
implemented.
Network recognition of designated critical users can be
accomplished by maintaining reference databases with perti-
nent information at each access point throughout the
network. A code or other type of identification data would
be entered when attempting to gain access to the network.
The network management system would compare the identifica-
tion data with the reference table to confirm the critical
user designation, and then grant access to the network.
Once access is obtained, a variety of functions can be
employed to support critical user communications. In recog-
nition of varying priorities among critical users, a multi-
level precedence preemption capability can be implemented,
similar to those found in the AUTOVON and AUTODIN systems
used in the military world. Multi-level precedence preemp-
tion (MLPP) allows critical users to obtain access to avail-
able circuitry in preference to other users, and if all
circuits are in use, the higher precedence of a given user
may force lower precedence users to relinquish circuits
required to effect the higher precedence communications,
even at the expense of ongoing communications [ Ref . 22:
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p. 26] . A further refinement would be installation of an
audible or visual alarm system to indicate incoming, high
precedence traffic. The use of flags or classmarks
reflecting precedence levels would trigger both the preemp-
tion and alarm functions as appropriate.
To further enhance performance of surviving portions of
the network, existing management controls can be modified
and applied as required. For example, selective trunk
reservation can be accomplished on the basis of precedence
levels rather than offered load to improve delivery of crit-
ical user traffic. Also, the use of expansive controls
would increase the options for alternate routing and allow
tailoring according to traffic priority and user precedence.
C. INTEROPERABILITY
The abundance of public and private communications
networks throughout the nation provides ample opportunity
for integration and redundancy of network resources in an
emergency communications system. The underlying philosophy
is that "the more ubiquitous and interconnected a network
is, the more difficult it would be to destroy its connec-
tivity" [ Ref . 23: p. 1] • By interconnecting a variety of
networks, the survivability of the composite whole will be
greater than the individual survivability of its component
parts. This concept is examined in a study performed for
the Defense Nuclear Agency by SRI, which includes a proposal
for an aggregate system called USNET (Ubiquitous Survivable
Network) [Ref. 23]. The USNET concept integrates various
networks through the use of intelligent devices called gate-
ways which provide the interface and switching functions
required to route traffic between distinct networks.
Depending on the physical separation between the networks to
be interconnected, the gateway will be characterized as
either centralized or distributed. A centralized gateway
connects individual networks by direct physical attachment
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such as a cable or optical fiber, and imbedded software
programs perform required format translations and other
interface requirements. The distributed gateway is actually
a "mini" communications link between the networks to be
interconnected and interface requirements can be satisfied
at either end of the gateway link [ Ref . 23: pp. 93-95] . The
gateway function is accomplished using computer technology
and can be imbedded in intelligent switching systems such as
SPC exchanges. In addition to enhancing survivability, the
ability to interconnect distinct networks increases the
options for alternate routing, thereby contributing to the
success of critical user communications.
D. RESPONSIVE NETWORK MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
The use of network management controls in support of an
emergency communications system is a prime factor in
sustaining connectivity among surviving portions of the
network, and in maximizing utilization of available
capacity. The distribution of intelligent switching systems
with imbedded automatic control capabilities ensures that a
modicum of control can be exerted on surviving portions of
the network. In addition, management centers with manual
control capabilities should be distributed throughout the
network to provide more optimal control response to changing
network conditions. As discussed in Chapter II of this
paper, control functions are one of the two basic components
of network management systems. To effectively support an
emergency communications system, the following controls
should be implemented with the option of either automatic or
manual activation:
1. Access Control--performs the functions discussed
earlier in order to guarantee availability of
surviving network resources to designated critical
users, and to activate control actions which support
critical user communications, such as precedence
routing.
2. Alternate Routing--perhaps the most important control
function to be activated in an emergency situation,
the ability of surviving network elements to select
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the best path for routing emergency traffic is essen-
tial in sustaining connectivity and maximizing utili-
zation of available capacity.
3. Selective Reservation--the ability to reserve circuits
for specific types of traffic, particularly on the
basis of precedence levels.
In addition, other restrictive and expansive controls may be
initiated as required by the situation at hand.
E. DISTRIBUTED NETWORK MONITORING
Acquisition and reporting of status, configuration and
performance data is essential to establishing emergency
communications, restoring damaged portions of the network,
and gradually reconstituting the entire communications
network. Monitoring of subordinate portions of the network
by intelligent network devices should be supplemented by a
remote monitoring capability at selected locations
throughout the network. In addition, reporting of required
data should be able to be performed both horizontally and
vertically to reduce the impact of the loss of superior
elements in the network management hierarchy. If the next
higher element which normally receives data is destroyed or
cannot be reached, pertinent data can be communicated later-
ally through peer elements until a path to a higher level
element is reached. The availability of timely and accurate
data regarding conditions throughout the network determines
the effectiveness of control responses since those responses
are made on the basis of available information.
Successful implementation of the five characteristics
discussed above will result in an emergency communications
system that displays most of the essential attributes as
defined by SRI. It must be emphasized, however, that this
discussion is concerned with the role of a network manage-
ment system, and there are many external considerations to
be taken into account when developing an emergency communi-
cations system. Also it should be remembered that while the
characteristics above are categorized as network management
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functions, their effectiveness can be enhanced by other
factors such as hardening and EMP shielding, mobility or
concealment.
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V. A MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROPOSAL
The following proposal for a network management system
is applicable to a generic emergency communications system.
A "black-box" approach is used wherein the "what" and not
the "how to" is considered. In addition, the underlying
assumption is that to minimize the impact of constraining
factors such as time and money, existing resources will be
used to the greatest extent that is practicable. The inten-
tion is to develop a system that satisfies the requirements
defined in the preceding chapter, and is, therefore, capable
of supporting an emergency communications system regardless
of the nature of the emergency, its scope, or its impact.
The generic emergency communications system consists of
the Public Telephone Network and a variety of supplemental
networks from the public and private sectors. Network
switching systems utilize state-of-the-art technology and
fall into five classes:
Regional (Class 1)
Sectional (Class 2)
Local Area (Class 3)
- Toll (Class 4)
- End Office (Class 5)
These classes are analagous to the classification
currently used in the Bell System with the exception of the
Class 3 switches. The local area designation at the Class 3
level is used in deference to the definition of Local Access
and Transport Areas (LATA) in Bell's implementation plan for
the modified final judgement in the antitrust suit. In
addition, the proliferation theory indicates that lower
level switches, i.e. , Class 4 and Class 5, are more likely
to survive in most emergency situations due to their signif-
icantly greater number and wider distribution throughout the
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network. For this reason, the lower level switches will be
key components of the proposed network management system.
A. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
The proposed network management system is based on a
four-level hierarchy structured as follows:
National Management Center (1)
Area Management Centers ( 3
)
Regional Management Centers (10)
Local Management Centers (30)
1. National Management Center
The National Management Center sits atop the
proposed network management system and has overall responsi-
bility for operation of the entire emergency network. Its
basic objectives are the same as those of the Bell System's
Network Operations Center (see Chapter III). Therefore,
National Management Center operations during an actual emer-
gency situation consist of monitoring the status of those
portions of the system which survived, providing guidance to
lower-level management facilities as required to ensure
optimal use of exisiting resources, and to resolve network
problems which transcend the capabilities of the Area
Management Centers. In addition, the National Management
Center is capable of assuming the responsibilities of any
one, two, or all three of the Area Management Centers in the
event of failure or destruction. The National Management
Center itself is "backed up" by the three Area Management
Centers which are described in the next section. Should the
National Center fail or be destroyed, overall system respon-
sibility is assumed by one of the Area Centers, in accor-
dance with pre-established policy guidelines. As will be
seen in the next section, each Area Center maintains
national databases, and therefore, the assumption of
national responsibility poses no transitional problems.
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2. Area Management Centers
The Area Management Centers occupy the next highest
level of the proposed hierarchy and are responsible for
managing and coordinating the operations of the regional and
local management centers within their respective areas of
responsibility. The areas of responsibility are defined by
dividing the United States into three geographic areas arbi-
trarily labelled as the Eastern, Mid-American and Western
operating areas. In addition, each of the Area Management
Centers has the capability of assuming the responsibilities
of either one, or both, of the other Area Centers. This
requires horizontal as well as vertical communications capa-
bilities, and the ability to terminate circuits from the ten
Regional Management Centers in each of the Area Centers. In
addition, each of the Area Management Centers must maintain
complete national databases to support the backup capa-
bility. Furthermore, in the event that the National
Management Center fails, or is destroyed, overall responsi-
bility for the emergency system shifts to one of the Area
Centers according to a predetermined "line of succession".
3. Regional Management Centers
The ten Regional Management Centers reflect the Bell
System' s ten switching regions which encompass the entire
nation. Each Regional Center is responsible for monitoring
and controlling activities of the subordinate local manage-
ment centers, and is capable of assuming their responsibili-
ties in the event of failure. In addition, each Regional
Center is capable of assuming the operational responsibili-
ties of two of the adjacent Regional Centers at one time.
4. Local Management Centers
Although they occupy the lowest level of the
proposed management system hierarchy, the Local Centers are
the most critical elements of the system. It is at this
level that the bulk of the monitoring and control functions
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are performed. The Local Centers are responsible for moni-
toring and controlling subordinate portions of the network.
The total of thirty Local Centers results from the alloca-
tion of three within each of the ten switching regions.
B. SYSTEM OPERATIONS
The proposed network management system normally exists
in a standby mode where the component network elements
conduct "business as usual" until emergency conditions are
declared. At that point in time, appropriate signals are
transmitted through the management hierarchy to activate
emergency mechanisms including access controls, horizontal
communications capabilities between management centers, and
increased reporting periodicities. The lower level network
elements continue monitoring subordinate portions of the
network, and forward reports in response to polling messages
from higher level network components. If no polling
messages are received within a predetermined time span,
reports are automatically forwarded to designated alternate
local centers. At the local management centers, an overall
assessment of network conditions is gradually constructed on
the basis of incoming data. The absence of data is also
significant for if reports are not received from specific
network elements within established time intervals, those
elements are assumed to have failed. Appropriate informa-
tion is also forwarded to the next higher level management
center where the same process takes place. Gradually, each
surviving management center obtains a picture of conditions
in the subordinate portions of the network, and determines
what remedial actions should be taken.
As communications are attempted, user identification
data is compared with reference tables to confirm designa-
tion as a critical user, and to determine the appropriate
precedence for that critical user. If the comparison
results are negative, the call is terminated. If the desig-
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nation is confirmed, access is granted with traffic flagged
appropriately to trigger precedence-based control mechanisms
which support the critical user communications. If condi-
tions warrant, selected circuits will be reserved for
specific types of traffic as long as demand exists. If
these reserved circuits become idle beyond established
thresholds, they will be released for other types of
traffic. As traffic is routed through surviving portions of
the network, monitoring data is utilized at each switching
point to determine the best route to use for the next link
in the communications path. This may involve use of another
network. In this case, traffic is routed to the appropriate
gateway where format translation and other interface
requirements are performed, and that network serves as the
next link in the communications chain. Additional restric-
tive and/or expansive controls are implemented as dictated
by the situation at hand.
At surviving regional and national management centers,
network status and configuration as well as traffic load are
monitored closely, and control responses initiated at lower
levels are adjusted as required to obtain optimal perform-
ance and response. As incoming data indicates that damaged
portions of the network have been restored, this information
is transmitted through the network so databases may be
updated, and monitoring and control functions can be
adjusted accordingly. In this manner, restored portions of
the network are brought back into service, capacity is
increased, the level of service to users is increased, and
gradually full service operations are restored. As the
network is gradually reconstituted, control measures are
relaxed accordingly, and access is granted to an ever-
increasing segment of the affected population.
Obviously, this proposed network management system
closely resembles the network management system implemented
49
in the Bell System's Message Telecommunications Service as
discussed in Chapter III. Given ATC years of experience and
accumulated expertise, it is not surprising that their oper-
ational system offers the majority of functions and capabil-
ities desired in a network management system capable of
supporting an emergency communications system.
Modifications to the MTS network management system incorpo-
rated into the proposed system are as follows:
1. Greater redundancy of management facilities at the
national and local levels to increase survivability.
2. Establishment of Area Management Centers at the second
level of the proposed management system hierarchy to
enhance control of the network during a crisis, and to
provide back-up services should the National
Management Center capabilities be lost.
3. Distribution of Class 3 switches on the basis of LATAs
as defined in the implementation plan for the modified
final judgement to lessen the long term impacts of
divestiture.
4. Lateral reporting capabilities at each level of the
network management hierarchy to facilitate redundancy
of network components and provision of back-up
services at peer levels.
5. Inclusion of access controls and other precedence-
based control functions to support critical user
communications.
The proposed management system uses a proliferation
approach to cope with the impacts of an emergency situation.
However, like the emergency communications system itself,
the effectiveness of the proposed network management system
will be enhanced by hardening of facilities and other
external procedures which may be initiated.
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VI. SUMMARY
The focal point of this thesis has been internal network
management and its role in supporting a generic emergency
communications system. In addition a proposed network
management system for a generic emergency communications
system was described, and proved to be very closely related
to the network management system implemented in support of
the Bell System's Message Telecommunications Service. Not
only does this reflect ATC overwhelming experience and
expertise in the area of network management, but it leads to
the conclusion that the major problems in actually fielding
an effective network management system to support emergency
communications requirements are not internal network manage-
ment problems. The technical capabilities and the necessary
resources for developing and implementing an effective
network management system to support emergency communica-
tions are readily available. With relatively minor modifi-
cations, the same system used in day-to-day operations is
more than capable of functioning with equal efficiency and
effectiveness in an emergency situation. In this context,
the following recommendations are offered for consideration:
1. Increase distribution of network management facilities
to provide greater redundancy in monitoring and manual
control capabilities.
2. Accelerate conversion of remaining electromechanical
switches to modern SPC switching systems to maintain
control as low as possible in the hierarchy. and
therefore with as wide a distribution as possible.
3. Develop an increased capability for remote monitoring
and manual control of the network.
4. Initiate periodic testing of emergency communications
systems to help ensure that they will be operationally
ready when they are needed.
5. Pursue development of more efficient methods of inter-
connecting diverse networks, and implementation of
industry-wide standards to simplify interface consid-
erations.
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These initiatives will refine existing network managementca-
pabilities and enhance the internal management of emergency
communications systems.
On a larger scale, the barriers to effective emergency
communications are both numerous and complex. Long-standing
problems of parochialism, profit motivation and lack of
incentive have been compounded by the divestiture of AT&T.
The impacts of divestiture have yet to be felt in their
entirety, but it is safe to say that they will not help the
situation. Adding to the problems is the fact that within
the government itself there is no central policy-making body
to direct and coordinate the numerous entities whose efforts
impact on the telecommunications infrastructure. Every day,
the news media report situations that underscore the neces-
sity of maintaining an effective emergency communications
capability. The ultimate disaster - nuclear conflict - has
been averted thus far, but the possibility is very real. In
1981, President Reagan stated that our national communica-
tions system must be made "foolproof" [ Ref . 15: p. 4] , but
now, five years later, it most certainly is not foolproof,
and in fact may have regressed as a result of divestiture.
The requirement is clear. The motivation should be suffi-
cient: "The consequence of failures of communications can
be devastating. When communications fail, people die need-
lessly" [Ref. 1: p. 1] . Therefore it is incumbent upon
leaders of both government and industry to overcome bureau-
cratic, economic and political obstacles, and to take full
advantage of available resources and advancing technology to
develop and implement an emergency communications capability
that ensures that vital communications will be available




ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency
AT&T American Telephone and Telegraph
BOC Bell Operating Company
CCIS Common Channel Interoffice Signalling
CCS Common Channel Signalling
DSN Defense Switched Network
DTP Data Transfer Point
EADAS Engineering Administrative Data Acquisition System
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
ESS Electronic Switching System
HFDF High Frequency Direction Finding
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
ITT International Telephone and Telegraph
LATA Local Access and Transport Area
MLPP Multilevel Precedence Preemption
MTS Message Telecommunications Service
NCC Network Control Center
NETS Nationwide Emergency Telecommunications System
NMC Network Management Center
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NOC Network Operations Center
NOCS Network Operations Center System
NS/EP National Security/Emergency Preparedness
PDN Public Data Network
PSN Public Switched Network
PTN Public Telephone Network
ROC Regional Operations Center
SPC Stored-Program Control
SRI Stanford Research Institute
STP Signal Transfer Point
WATS Wide Area Telephone Service
54
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Stanford Research Institute International, Final
Report : A Review of National Security ^ Emergency
Preparedness Telecommunications Policy , February 19817
2. Gimpelson, Lester A. < "Network Management: Design and
Control of Communications Networks", Electrical
Communications . Volume 49, Number 1, 19/4.
3. Haenschke, D. G. and Ebner, G. C. , "Network Management",
The Bell System Technical Journal . Volume 52, Number
Tr"Part 3, September 1983.
4. Wong, Dominic H. , "The Future of Network Management",
Telecommunication Journal, Volume 53, Number III,
March 1984.
5. Westcott, Jil, Burruss, John and Begg, Vivenne,
Automated Network Management , Proceedings of IEEE
INFOCOM '85 . March 1985.
6. Dzubeck, F. X. , "Network Management: A Customer
Perspective , Proceedings of the Fifth International
Conference on Computer Communications , October 1980.
7. Hyde, P.N. and Wilbur. G. A. , "Management of
Packet-Switching Networks , Conference Record of
GLOBECOM ' 85 ( IEEE Global Telecommunications
Conference)" December 1985.
8. Jenkins, C. H. and Tor, Z. J. , "The Need for Network
Management" Telecommunication Journal . Volume 51,
Number II, February 1984.
9. Bressler, R. D. and Haverty, J. , "Computers in
Communication Networks , Telecommunications (North
American Edition), January 1985.
10. Mocenigo, J. M. and Tow, D. M. , "Managing a network that
won t stand still". Bell Laboratories Record, August
11.
1984.
Ritchie, A. E. and Tuomenoksa, L- S. , "No. 4 ESS: System
Objectives and Organization , The Bell System
Technical Journal . Volume 55, Number T, September
1977.
12. Browne, Thomas E. , Ewin. James C. and Reilly, Gerard
P.. No. 5 ESS - versatile, flexible, forward-looking ,
Bell Laboratories Record, Volume 59, Number 9,
November 1981.
55
13. Johnson, Jerry W. , Kennedy, James C. and Warner, Jack
C, . Wo- 5 ESS - serving the present, serving the
future , Bell Laboratories Record . Volume 59, Number
10, December I'^^T.
14. Miller, P. R. and Wallace, R. E. , "Common Channel
Interoffice Signalling: Signalling Network , The Bell
System Technical Journal, Volume 57, Number 27
February 1978.
15. Greene, T. V. , Haenschke, D. G. , Hornbach, B. H. and
Johnson. C. E, , Network Management and TrafficAdministration , The Bell System Technical Journal,
Volume 56, Number 7"^ September 1977.
16. Boiling^ George H. , AT&T : The Aftermath of Antitrust -
Preserving Positive Command and ControT . National
Defense University, 1983.
17. Foree, Stephen C. , Secure Transmission of Sensitive
Information via the Nationwide Emergency Transmission
System ( NETST^M. S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, March 1985.
18. Bartz, W. S. and Patterson, R. W. < "National Network
Management" The Bell System Technical Journal, Volume
62, Number 7, Part 3, September 1983.
19. Haenschke, D. G. , Kettler, D. A. and Oberer, E.
,
Network Management and Congestion in the U. S.
Telecommunications Network", IEEE Transactions on
Communications . Volume COM-29, Number 4, April 1981.
20. Sevcik, Peter J, , Williams, Graeme J. and Hitson,
Bruce L. , "Defense Data Network Survivability"
Conference Record of EASCON ^82 ( 15th Annual
Electronics and Aerospace Systems Conference )
.
September 1982.
21. Oaks< B.C. and Logan, S. R. , "Defense Switched Network:
Survivability through Proliferation, Conference
Record of EASCON ' 82 (15th Annual Electronics anS
Aerospace Systems Conference ) . September 1982.
22. Schmidt, R. and Cronin, J. K. . Wartime Reconfiguration
of the Public Telephone Network . BDM Corporation,
Mclean, Virginia, April 198U^
23. Lomax, John B. and Rubin. Darryl E. . Final Report :
New Concepts in Survivable Communications Networks
.
SRI International, Menlo Park" California, July 1981.
56
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allers^ J. E. , Hamilton, S. T. and Kukla, J. A. , "The No. 5 ESS
Switching System: Robust and ready for changes". Bell
Laboratories Record . Volume 51, Number 5, May/June 1983.
Carestia, P.D. and Patterson^ R. W. , "Enhanced software helps
managers keep network traffic moving". Bell Laboratories
Record . Volume 61, Number 4, April 1983.
Cole, Leo J. and Ryder, Keith D. , "The Information System:
An Implementation of Network Management in a large SNA
network". Conference Record: GLOBECOM ' 83 ( IEEE Global
Telecommunications Conference 1983 ) . Volume 2, 1983.
Defense Nuclear Agency, Wartime Reconfiguration of the
Public Telephone Network . Final Report, April 1980.
Department of the Navy. Navy Telecommunications System
Architecture Study . Final Report, Volume I, May 1974.
Foree, Stephen C. , Secure Transmission of Sensitive
Information via the Nationwide Emergency TeTecommunications
System ( NETSTT" M. S. Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, March 1985.
Gilkinson, F. M. , Corkovic, S. S. and Kennedy, J. A.
,
"Monitoring and Management Systems for DATAROUTE", National
Telecommunications Conference Record . 1981.
Haenschke. Detlev G. and Ebner, George C. , "Network
Management", The Bell System Technical Journal, Volume 62,
Number 7, Part 3, September 1983.
Haenschke. Detlev G. , Kettler, D. A. and Oberer, E. , "Network
Management and Congestion in the U. S. Telecommunications
Network", IEEE Transactions on Communications . Volume
COM-29, Number"?, April 1981.
Hart, Larry, "Network Management - a user perspective".
Telecommunications (North American Edition), Volume 18,
Number 7, July 1984.
Hedge, Kenneth, "ATC Olympic Network", Telecommunications
( North American Edition ) . Volume 18, Number 7, July 1984.
Horgan, John, "Safeguarding the National Security", IEEE
Spectrum . Volume 22, Number II, November 1985.
Hyde, P.N. and Wilbur, G. A. , "Management of Packet-Switching
Networks
,
Conference Record of GLOBECOM '85 ( IEEE Global
Telecommunications Conference 1985 ). December 1985.
Jenkins, C. H. and Tor, Z. J. , "The Need for Network
Management", Telecommunication Journal, Volume 51, Number
II, February 1^^^:
Johnson, Jerry, W. , Kennedy, James C. and Warner, Jack C.
No. 5 ESS - serving the present, serving the future" Bell
Laboratories Record, Volume 59, Number 10, December 1981.
57
Kasperek, Gabriel, "Comparing various network management
schemes , Data Communications . July 1985.
Lyon, D. , "Network Control: A View from the DCE",
Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on
Computer Communications . October 1980.
McKenzie, A. A. , Cosell, B. P. , McQuillan, J. M. and Thorpe,
M. J. , "The Network Control Center for the ARPA Network",
Computer Networking . IEEE Press, 1976.
Miller, P. R. and Wallace, R. E. , "Common Channel Interoffice
Signalling", The Bell System Technical Journal, Volume 57,
Number 2, February 1978.
Mocenigo^ J. M. and Tow, D. M. < "Managing a network that won't
stand still". Bell Laboratories Record . August 1984.
Reed, Terry, "Operating and managing a commercial worldwide
network". Computer Communications . Volume 8, Number 3, June
1985.
Ritchie, A. E. and Tuomenoksa, L- S. , "No. 4 ESS: System
Objectives and Organization", The Bell System Technical
Journal, Volume 55, Number 7, September 1977T
Santos. P. J. , Chalstrom, H. B. , Linn, J. and Herman, J. G.
,
"Architecture of a Network Monitoring, Control and
Management System", Proceedings of the Fifth International
Conference on Computer Communications . October 1980.
Slate, Edward L. and Popko, John A.
^
"The Next Five Years in
Communications", Telecommunications ( North American
Edition), Volume 20, Number 1, January 1986.
Stanford Research Institute International, Final Report : A
Review of National Security - Emergency Preparedness
Telecommunications Policy . February 1981.
Stach, Jerrold F. , "Expert systems find a new place in data
networks". Data Communications . November 1985.
Walker^ Charles J. , "Network Management in the post-
divestiture era". Data Communications . February 1984.
Westcott, Jil, Burruss, John and Begg, Vivienne, "Automated
Network Management", Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM ' 85 . March
1985.
Wong, Dominic H. , "The future of network management".





1. Superintendent, Code 54LP 1
Attn: Prof. J. LaPatra
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
2. Superintendent, Code 54M0 1





4. Commander, Naval Security Group Command
Code: 030 (Attn: LT R. L. DeLorey Jr.)
3801 Nebraska Avenue NW
Washington, D. C. 20390-5210
5. Mr. Ken Boheim
NCS/PP
8th Street & S. Courthouse Road
Arlington, Virginia, 22204
6. Mr. Edward M. Cain
NCS/PP
8th Street & S. Courthouse Road
Arlington, Virginia 22204
7. Dr. Bruce Barrow
NCS/PP
8th Street & S. Courthouse Road
Arlington, Virginia 22204
8. COL William Schooler
NCS/EP
8th Street & S. Courthouse Road
Arlington, Virginia 22204
9. Mr. Norman Douglas
NCS/EP
8th Street & S. Courthouse Road
Arlington, Virginia 22204
10. LTC Tom Cindric (JDSSC)
Defense Communications Agency
Code 662
Washington, D. C. 20305
















in an emergency com-
munications system.
"""X ,
^^i^'^^

